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CASENOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Dismissal of a Government Em-,
ployee, who had an Expectation of Continued Employment,
for Stigmatizing Reasons does not Constitute an Unconstitu-
tional Deprivation of Property or Liberty. Bishop v. Wood, 96
S. Ct. 2074 (1976).
Procedural due process requires that a government employee be afford-
ed a -termination hearing if he can demonstrate that he has been deprived of
"liberty" or "property"' as a result of being discharged from his job. The
Supreme Court has defined a liberty interest in public employment as the
right to be free from damaging statements in the course of dismissal. 2
Correspondingly, a property interest is said to arise when an individual has
an expectation of continued employment based upon provisions in employ-
ment statutes or contracts. 3  Recently, however, in Bishop v. Wood,4 the
Supreme Court ruled that due process protections do not necessarily attach
even when an employee has an apparent expectation of continued employ-
ment and when his reputation may be damaged as a direct result of
termination.5
The petitioner, Carl Bishop, was hired as a policeman for the city of
Marion, North Carolina, in 1969. In 1972, -the Marion City Manager,
acting on the recommendation of the Chief of Police, terminated Bishop's
employment without affording him a hearing to determine the sufficiency of
the grounds for his discharge. 6 The petitioner was informed that his
1. The fifth and fourteenth amendments provide that no person shall be deprived of
life, liberty, or property without due process of law. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV, § 1.
2. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701-10 (1976); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S.
134, 157 (1974).
3. See Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593
(1972); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
4. 96 S. Ct. 2074 (1976).
5. Id. at 2079-80.
6. Id. at 2077. Article II, section 6, of the personnel ordinance of the City of
Marion provides:
Dismissal; A permanent employee whose work is not satisfactory over a period
of time shall be notified in what way his work is deficient and what he must
do if his work is to be satisfactory. If a permanent employee fails to perform
work up to the standard of the classification held, or continues to be negligent,
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dismissal was based on a failure to follow orders, poor attendance at police
training classes, contributing to low morale, and conduct unbecoming an
officer. 7  After his removal, Bishop brought suit in federal district court
alleging that the city's failure to provide him a hearing violated his constitu-
tional rights of due process as guaranteed by the fifth and fourteenth
amendments.8 The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the
city, finding that it had not created any expectation of continued employ-
ment and therefore had not deprived Bishop of any constitutionally protected
interest. 9 The court of appeals affirmed per curiam, 10 and certiorari was
granted." 1
-In affirming the district court, the Supreme Court held that Bishop had not
been deprived of a property or liberty interest and thus was not entitled to a
hearing prior to his removal. 12  Although the majority conceded that the
Marion city ordinance could be read to guarantee a property interest in
continued employment,13 the Court deferred to the district court's interpreta-
tion that the statute was not so intended. 14 Justice Brennan, joined by
Justice Marshall in dissent, asserted that Bishop was deprived of a liberty
interest, noting that his opportunities to obtain future employment would be
constrained due to the stigmatizing effects of the charges levied against
him.' 5 Similarly, Justice White, joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and
inefficient, or unfit to perform his duties, he may be dismissed by the City
Manager. Any discharged employee shall be given written notice of his dis-
charge setting forth the effective date and reasons for his discharge if he
shall request such a notice.
7. The reasons were communicated orally to Bishop in private, but they were never
given to him in writing until provided in answers to interrogatories during pretrial
discovery. See 96 S. Ct. 2074, 2076 (1976).
8. At the district court level Bishop argued that since he had been on the police
force for over six months and was therefore considered a "permanent" employee, he had
acquired tenure or at least an expectancy of continued employment sufficient to
constitute a property right. See Bishop v. Wood, 377 F. Supp. 501, 503 (W.D.N.C.
1973).
9. Id. at 505.
10. 498 F.2d 1341 (1974).
11. 423 U.S. 890 (1975).
12. 96 S. Ct. 2074 (1976).
13. Id. at 2078.
14. Id. at 2078-81. No North Carolina court had ever interpreted this ordinance.
When a state law is subject to differing interpretations and there is no state decision
clarifying it, federal courts may proceed to resolve the question. When this has been
done the Supreme Court will occasionally defer to the decision of the lower courts, based
on the presumption that the lower courts are more familiar with local law and hence
more qualified to render judgment. See Field, Abstention in Constitutional Cases: The
Scope of the Pullman Abstention Doctrine, 122 U. PA..L. REv. 1071, 1091 n.86 (1974).
15. 96 S. Ct. at 2080-81.
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Blackmun, argued that the petitioner did have a constitutionally protected
property interest in his position that required due process protection i" and
that, by approving the district court's opinion, the majority had effectively
ruled against the dictates of prior law. 17
I. THE EVOLUTION OF PROPERTY AND LIBERTY INTERESTS
UNDER DUE PROCESS
Only recently, through judicial recognition that public employment may
confer property and liberty rights upon an individual, has the due process
clause become significant in relation to government employment. From
Justice Holmes' finding that a person "may have a constitutional right to talk
politics, but . . . no constitutional right to be a policeman,"18 to the court's
observation in Bailey v. Richardson9 that "the due process clause does not
apply to the holding of a Government office,"' 20 public employment had been
considered a privilege to which due process guarantees would not attach. 21
Since Bailey, however, there has been a general broadening of litigants'
procedural protections 22 which has been paralleled by an erosion of the
"rights-privilege" theory. 23  Significant inroads have been made in that
doctrine by rulings that protect the ability of individuals to exercise basic
constitutional rights in the course of public employment 24 and by decisions
that have recognized distinct property and liberty interests in government
positions. 25
16. Id. at 2085 (White, Brennan, Marshall, & Blackmun, JJ., dissenting).
17. Id. at 2083-84. Justice Blackmun stated his belief that the district court's analysis
of state law was improper. Id. at 2085-86. See text accompanying notes 69-72 infra.
18. Holmes first suggested the "rights-privileges" distinction in McAuliffe v. Mayor of
New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 220, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (1892).
19. 182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 341 U.S. 918
(1951).
20. Id. at 57.
21. See Case Comments, Constitutional Laws: No Hearing Required Prior to Dismis-
sal for Cause of Nonprobationary Federal Employee, 59 MINN. L. REv. 421, 423 (1974).
22. Among "property" interests that now fall within the ambit of procedural due
process requirements of prior hearings are; revocation of parole, Morrisey v. Brewer, 408
U.S. 471 (1972); repossession of goods, Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972);
revocation of driver's license, Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971); termination of
welfare benefits, Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); and garnishment of wages,
Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
23. See Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional
Law, 81 HARv. L. REV. 1439 (1968). See also Keim v. United States, 177 U.S. 290,
293-94 (1900).
24. See, e.g., Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968) (freedom of speech);
United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967) (freedom of association); Torcaso v.
Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961) (freedom of religion); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479
(1960) (freedom of association).
25. See Connell v. Higenbotham, 403 U.S. 207 (1971); Mohr & Willet, Constitutional
[Vol. 26:420
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One of the most significant of these latter rulings was Board of Regents v.
Roth.20  The respondent, Roth, was hired as a probationary assistant pro-
fessor at Wisconsin State University for one year. Under Wisconsin law,
a probationary employee had no guarantee of continued employment, 27 nor
did he have any grant of a hearing upon termination. 28  After being
informed that he would not be rehired and would not be given a termination
hearing, Roth brought suit against the university alleging infringement of his
due process rights. In the course of holding that there had been no due
process violations, the Supreme Court articulated standards for asserting
legitimate property and liberty interests. The majority stated that in order to
be entitled to claim a property right an individual must have secured a
beneficial interest 2 9 created or defined by some existing extra-constitutional
source, such as tenure provisions, contracts, or state law.3 0  In Roth's case,
since there was no state statute, university rule, policy, or contract that
granted him an interest in reemployment, the Court found that he had been
deprived of no property interest.3 '
The majority's analysis of the alleged liberty interest was considerably dif-
ferent. It maintained that a violation of liberty occurred when dismissal or
nonrenewal seriously damaged one's standing and associations in the commu-
nity3 2 or imposed a stigma or other disability that foreclosed an individual's
freedom to take advantage of future employment opportunities."3 While con-
and Procedural Aspects of Employee Access to Federal Courts: Promotion and Termi-
nation, 8 VALPARISO L. REv. 303, 312-22 (1974).
26. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
27. Roth was not a tenured professor, nor was there any basis for belief that his job
was permanent in nature. Wis. Stat. § 37.31(1) (1967), in force at that time, provided
in pertinent part that: "All teachers in any state university shall initially be employed on
probation. The employment shall be permanent, during efficiency and good behavior
after 4 years of continuous service in the state university system as a teacher."
28. Board of Regents Rule II provided: "During the time a faculty member is on
probation no reason for non-retention need be given. No review or appeal is provided in
such case."
29. "To have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more than
an abstract need or desire for it . . . . He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of en-
titlement to it." 408 U.S. at 577. The term "entitlement" was first used in Goldberg v.
Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 n.8 (1970). See generally Comment, Entitlement, Enjoyment,
and Due Process of Law, 1974 DuKE L.J. 89.
30. "[Property interests] are created and their dimensions are defined by existing
rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law-rules or
understandings that secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement to
those benefits." 408 U.S. at 577.
31. Id. at 576-78.
32. Id. at 573.
33. Id. The Court relied on the language of Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S.
433, 437 (1971): "Where a person's good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at
1977]
Catholic University Law Review
ceding that Roth's nonretention might impede his career, the Court did not
find that he was deprived of a liberty interest, noting that "[i]t stretches the
concept too far to suggest that a person is deprived of 'liberty' when he simply
is not rehired in one job but remains as free as before to seek another. '8 4
On the same day as Roth, the Court decided the companion case of Perry
v. Sindermann.3 5 Sindermann had taught at a state junior college for four
years under a series of one-year contracts. When his last contract expired,
the Board of Regents decided not to renew it and, as in Roth, failed to
provide the respondent a hearing on this decision. Sindermann brought suit
claiming that he had a right to a termination hearing. The Supreme Court
agreed, noting that, unlike Roth, Sindermann had alleged that the college
had a de facto tenure program. 6 The Court determined that the existence
of such a program justified a legitimate expectation of continued employment
and this constituted a sufficient property interest3 7 to require that the school
provide a termination hearing.38
After Sindermann and Roth, the bases for asserting a property interest
sufficient to invoke a hearing seemed well defined. A litigant would have to
show a claim of entitlement to a benefit that was created by contract, statute,
rule, or understanding. Under this analysis, procedural due process would
assure that an individual would not be arbitrarily deprived of a benefit to
which a state had said he was entitled. 39
stake because of what the government is doing to him, notice and an opportunity to be
heard are essential." See Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 191 (1952).
34. 408 U.S. at 575. Justice Douglas, dissenting, strongly disagreed with the majority
view: "Nonrenewal of a teacher's contract is tantamount to a dismissal and the conse-
quences may be enormous. Nonrenewal can be a blemish that turns into a permanent
scar and effectively limits any chance the teacher has of being rehired as a teacher,
at least in his State." 408 U.S. at 585. See Ground, Due Process and the Untenured
Teacher: A Review of Roth and Sindermann, 10 URBAN L. ANN. 283, 293 n.56 (1975).
35. 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
36. The Court quoted the Odessa tenure provisions:
Teacher Tenure: Odessa College has no tenure system. The Administration
of the College wishes the faculty member to feel that he has permanent tenure
as long as his teaching services are satisfactory and as long as he displays a
cooperative attitude toward his co-workers and his superiors, and as long as he
is happy in his work.
Id. at 600.
37. The Court noted that "[a] person's interest in a benefit is a 'property' interest for
due process purposes if there are such rules or mutually explicit understandings that
support his claim of entitlement to the benefit and that he may invoke at a hearing." Id.
at 601.
38. "In this case the respondent has alleged the existence of rules and understand-
ings, promulgated and fostered by state officials, that may justify his legitimate claim of
entitlement . . . ." Id. at 602-03.
39. See The Supreme Court, 1973 Term, 88 HARv. L. REv. 83, 86 (1974).
[Vol. 26:420
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Although this doctrine appeared to be clear after Sindermann and Roth,
the Supreme Court soon divided over its application in Arnett v. Kennedy.
40
Kennedy was an employee of the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO)4 1
who, following certain public comments critical of his superior, was removed
from office pursuant to provisions of the Lloyd-LaFollette Act. 42  Rather
than pursue an administrative appeal, 43 Kennedy brought suit alleging that
termination under the Act denied him due process of law because he was not
afforded a trial-type hearing prior to removal. 44 A majority of the Jus-
tices,45 applying the precedents of Roth and Sindermann, reasoned that
40. 416 U.S. 134 (1974).
41. Id. at 147.
42. 5 U.S.C. § 7501 (1970). This section provides in relevant part:
(a) An individual in the competitive service may be removed or suspended
without pay only for such cause as will promote the efficiency of the service.
(b) An individual in the competitive service whose removal or suspension
without pay is sought is entitled to reasons in writing and to -
(1) notice of the action sought and of any charges preferred against him;
(2) a copy of the charges;
(3) a reasonable time for filing a written answer to the charges, with
affidavits; and
(4) a written decision on the answer at the earliest practicable date.
Examination of witnesses, trial, or hearing is not required but may be provided
in the discretion of the individual directing the removal or suspension without
pay.
43. Kennedy was a "nonprobationary" employee and was therefore entitled to appeal
to the Civil Service Commission any decision involving his removal or suspension. 5
U.S.C. § 7701 (1970); 5 C.F.R. §§ 771.101-.226 (1974).
44. Kennedy was advised of his right to reply to the reasons for his dismissal in
writing or orally and to submit affidavits. He was also advised that the material upon
which his notice was based was available for his inspection. 416 U.S. at 137. Kennedy
additionally alleged that the Act was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. The
Court disagreed. See note 45 infra.
45. The judgment of the Court was delivered in a plurality opinion written by Justice
Rehnquist in which Chief Justice Burger and Justice Stewart joined. The views of the
Court were presented in five opinions, which can be summarized as follows:
(1) Plaintiff was not entitled to a full evidentiary hearing prior to removal
(6-3, Marshall, Brennan, & Douglas, JJ., dissenting).
(a) Plaintiff had a "property" interest in his employment requiring procedural
due process protection (6-3, Rehnquist, Burger, & Stewart, JJ., disagreeing).
(b) Procedural due process protection of plaintiff's "property" interest did not
require a full prior hearing (3-3, Marshall, Brennan, & Douglas, JJ., disagree-
ing; Rehnquist, Burger, & Stewart, JJ., not reaching the question).
(c) Protection of plaintiff's "liberty" interest did not require a full prior hear-
ing (5-3, Marshall, Brennan, & Douglas, JJ., disagreeing; White, J., not ad-
dressing the question).
(2) Plaintiff could be discharged by the very person who brought the initial
charges against him (5-4, Marshall, Brennan, & Douglas, JJ., dissenting;
White, J., dissenting to the extent the hearing official was the object of slander
that was the basis for the proposed discharge).
1977]
Catholic University Law Review
since the statute guaranteed Kennedy continued employment absent cause
for discharge, he had a legitimate claim of entitlement which constituted a
property interest.4 6 The Court went on to say that, even though this interest
was established, the existing procedures provided Kennedy adequate due
process protection.4 7
Not all of the Justices, however, were as quick to follow the Roth-
Sindermann analysis. Justice Rehnquist, joined by Chief Justice Burger and
Justice Stewart, noted that the extent of the entitlement was determined by
the terms of the Lloyd-LaFollette Act; thus Kennedy had a property right in
his job only because the Act prohibited removal except for cause s.4  Justice
Rehnquist argued that if a state can substantively limit the extent of the
entitlement, it should also be able to limit the extent of dismissal procedures.
Since the Act delineated the procedures applicable to an individual's dismis-
sal, Rehnquist concluded that there could be no claim of entitlement to
continued employment once those procedures had been followed.4 9 Al-
though this argument has a certain logical appeal, the rest of the Court
disapproved of it, suggesting that while a state could define the extent of a
property interest, it could not thereafter deprive an individual of that interest
without constitutional due process safeguards. 50
(3) The Lloyd-LaFollette Act's standard for dismissal was not unconstitution-
ally vague or overbroad (6-3, Marshall, Brennan, & Douglas, JJ., dissenting).
The above summary appears in Case Comments, Constitutional Law: No Hearing
Required Prior to Dismissal for Cause of Nonprobationary Federal Employee, 59 MINN.
L. REv. 421, 422 n.6 (1974).
46. 416 U.S. at 166-67 (Powell & Blackmun, JJ., concurring in part); Id. at 184-85
(White J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Id. at 203-06 (Douglas J.,
dissenting); Id. at 208-09 (Marshall & Brennan, JJ., dissenting).
47. Once the threshold determination of an infringement of property or liberty has
been established, the extent of due process required is determined by balancing the
governmental interests against the individual's private interests. See Goldberg v. Kelly,
397 U.S. 254, 263 (1970); Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S.
886, 895 (1961). See generally Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REv.
1267 (1975). The Justices in Arnett differed as to the nature of the hearing required.
See note 45 supra.
48. 416 U.S. at 152.
49. But the very section of the statute which granted him that right, a right
which had previously existed only by virtue of administrative regulation, ex-
pressly provided also for the procedure by which "cause" was to be determined,
and expressly omitted the procedural guarantees which appellee insists are
mandated by the Constitution. Only by bifurcating the very sentence of the
Act of Congress which conferred upon appellee the right not to be removed
save for cause could it be said that he had an expectancy of that substantive
right without the procedural limitations which Congress attached to it.
416 U.S. at 152.
50. See note 46 supra.
[Vol. 26:420
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Unlike its property analysis, the Court was more unified in its discussion
of the liberty interest. Following the Roth approach, the Court stated that
liberty was not infringed by dismissal from employment alone, but rather by
dismissal based upon unsupported charges which could injure the reputation
of an employee. 51 It was further noted that if such charges are levied, due
process intercedes to provide the person an opportunity to clear his name.
The Court stated that if Kennedy had pursued an administrative appeal,
where he would have had a hearing, he would have had ample opportunity
to clear his name. Thus the majority concluded that due process had not
been violated. 52
This type of liberty interest analysis was subsequently modified in Paul v.
Davis.53 Davis' name and photograph had been placed upon a flyer
captioned "Active Shoplifters," which was distributed to merchants through-
out Louisville, Kentucky. 54 At that time, the respondent had been charged
with shoplifting but had not been convicted. 55 In an effort to seek redress,
Davis sued, claiming a deprivation of liberty. Specifically, he asserted that
the "shoplifter" designation would inhibit him from entering business estab-
lishments for fear of being suspected of shoplifting and would seriously
impair his future employment opportunities. 56 Ruling against Davis, the
Supreme Court narrowed the circumstances under which an individual could
claim a loss of liberty.51 The Court asserted that a liberty interest can only
trigger the procedural guarantees of the Constitution when there has been a
deprivation of a right granted by the state58 or where the state inflicts
51. 416 U.S. at 157.
52. "Since the purpose of the hearing in such a case is to provide the person 'an
opportunity to clear his name,' a hearing afforded by administrative appeal procedures
after the actual dismissal is a sufficient compliance with the requirements of the Due
Process Clause." Id. For an interesting discussion of the subsequent history of
Kennedy's claim, see Martin, The Improper Discharge of a Federal Employee by a
Constitutionally Permissible Process: The OEO Case, 28 AD. L. REv. 27 (1976).
53. 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
54. Id. at 694-97.
55. Id. Shortly after circulation of the flyer the charge against the respondent was
dismissed.
56. Id. at 697.
57. In its analysis, the Court reviewed and synthesized the holdings of several major
"liberty" cases: Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972) (liberty interest is
threatened if dismissal will impose stigma or disability on employee); Cafeteria & Res-
taurant Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961) (revocation of security clearance
not a deprivation of liberty); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952) (state loyalty
oath violates due process); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S.
123 (1951) (attorney general's designation of organizations as "communist" not a depri-
vation of liberty); United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946) (congressional with-
holding of government employee's pay stigmatized their reputations).
58. 424 U.S. at 710, citing Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975). The Court found
1977]
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damage to an individual's reputation in the course of employment termina-
tion. 59 Since Davis' case did not fall within either of these two categories
he was denied relief.
II. NARROWING THE ENTITLEMENT
After Davis, the methodology of liberty and property analysis appeared
well settled. Yet, the Court opted not to apply it in Bishop. It is unclear
why the Bishop Court would not accept the assertion of a deprivation of
property; not only was 'Bishop classified as a "permanent" employee, but he
was employed under an ordinance which plainly conditioned his dismissal on
cause, much like the statute in Arnett. 0 Accordingly, due process would
appear to require some form of a termination hearing. By a clever bit of
obfuscation, however, the Supreme Court avoided having to confront this
requirement.
The Court commenced its analysis of the property question with the usual
assertion that a claim of entitlement must be determined by reference to
state law.6 1 It proceeded to note, however, that the Marion ordinance was
susceptible of various interpretations and could be read as either providing or
failing to provide an entitlement. 62  Generally, when faced with such a
situation, the Court would examine the statute and determine de novo
whether an entitlement was present. Here, however, unlike Roth and
Sindermann, the district court and the court of appeals had already declared
that the ordinance did not confer a property interest upon Bishop. Accord-
ingly, the Court held that since there was no authoritative state court inter-
that the language of Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971), stating
"[wihere a person's good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake because of
what the government is doing to him, notice and an opportunity to be heard are essen-
tial," referred only to governmental action depriving an individual of a right previously
held under state law. 424 U.S. at 708.
59. 424 U.S. at 710.
60. Indeed, the Marion ordinance is more specific as to grounds for dismissal than the
statute involved in Arnett. The only element the Marion ordinance lacks is the phrase
"for cause." 5 U.S.C. § 7501 (1970), the basis for the Arnett decision, provides in part:
"(a) An individual in the competitive service may be removed or suspended without pay
only for such cause as will promote the efficiency of the service."
61. 96 S. Ct. at 2077-78. See note 30 supra.
62. The Court stated:
On its face the ordinance on which petitioner relies may fairly be read as
conferring such a guarantee. However, such a reading is not the only possible
interpretation; the ordinance may also be construed as granting no right to
continued employment but merely conditioning an employee's removal on com-
pliance with certain specified procedures.
96 S. Ct. at 2078.
[Vol. 26:420
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pretation of the ordinance, it would defer to the district court's interpre-
tation. 63
The Court's deference seems misplaced. When confronted with questions
of state law that bear upon the judgment of the lower federal courts, the
Supreme Court is reluctant to overrule decisions by federal judges supposed-
ly skilled in the law of particular states. 64  In these situations the Court will
ordinarily defer6 5 to the lower court's interpretation of state law unless it is
clearly erroneous or unreasonable.6 6 In Bishop, the district court's opinion
could have been considered unreasonable;67 at best it was clearly flawed.
The district court totally ignored the "cause" criterion in the Marion
ordinance, stating flatly that "the city had not created by regulation or
policy, any condition in which its employees could expect continued employ-
ment." 68 More important, as was noted by Justices Blackmun and Brennan
63. Id. at 2078-79.
64. See, e.g., United States v. Durham Lumber Co., 363 U.S. 522, 526-27 (1960)
(interpretation of North Carolina property law); Propper v. Clark, 337 U.S. 472, 486-87
(1949) (determination of responsibilities of "temporary receiver" under N.Y. Civ. Prac.
Act); Township of Hillsborough v. Cromwell, 326 U.S. 620, 629-30 (1946) (determina-
tion of validity of state tax assessment); Huddleston v. Dwyer, 322 U.S. 232, 237 (1944)
(remand for interpretation of Oklahoma rulings on tax assessment); MacGregor v.
Mutual Life Assurance Co., 315 U.S. 280, 281 (1942) (construction of Michigan
statute).
65. The concept of deference is not to be confused with the somewhat similar
doctrine of abstention. Under the abstention doctrine, the Court will refuse to hear a
case for fear that a "federal court decision of some state law issues risks improvident
interference with a valid state program or unnecessary decision of a federal constitutional
question ...... Field, Abstention in Constitutional Cases: The Scope of the Pullman
Abstention Doctrine, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 1071, 1090 (1974). See Railroad Comm'n
v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
66. See United States v. Durham Lumber Co., 363 U.S. 522, 526-27 (1960) (defer-
ence to lower court's interpretation of state property law); Sims v. United States, 359
U.S. 108, 114 (1959) (deference to lower court's interpretation of duties of state
auditor); Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530, 534 (1949)
(deference to lower court's determination of applicability of state statute of limitations);
Estate of Spiegel v. Comm'r, 335 U.S. 701, 707-08 (1949) (deference to lower
court's determination of rights of reverter of trust settlor).
67. Even if a decision is not unreasonable it is arguable that the Court should not
ipso facto defer. This should hold particularly true in a situation such as Bishop, where
state law has become the determinative factor in applying federal constitutional guaran-
tees. In Helvering v. Stuart, 317 U.S. 154 (1942), a case often cited in support of
deference, Mr. Justice Stone, joined by Justices Black and Douglas in dissent, noted:
"When state law has not been authoritatively declared we pay great deference to the
reasoned opinion of circuit courts of appeals . . . . But we have not wholly abdicated
our function of reviewing such determinations of state law, merely because courts of
appeals have made them." Id. at 172.
68. 377 F. Supp. 501, 505 (W.D.N.C. 1973).
1977]
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in dissent, 9 the lower court misconstrued state law. The district court
relied on Still v. Lance,70 a state court decision, for the proposition
that a "contract of employment which contains no provision for the duration
or termination of employment is terminable at the will of either party."'1
The Still court, however, arrived at this conclusion in the context of a statute
that contained no "for cause" standard. 72 The North Carolina court noted
that this was in sharp contrast with another provision of the statute that
required "cause" for dismissal. 73 Under that provision, notice and hearing
were required.74  The Marion ordinance with its "cause" standards is thus
similar to this latter portion of the statute in Still, and would also appear to
require termination notice and hearing.75
A final consideration weighing in favor of an independent review of the
state law by the Supreme Court was that the district court opinion was
written prior to the decision in Arnett v. Kennedy. Given the similarities of
the statutes in Bishop and Arnett, the latter decision might have provided
grounds for the district court to find an entitlement. The Court, however,
did not consider this factor 76 or any other factor unfavorable to its deference
to the district court's interpretation. Instead the Court concluded that,
because the district court's interpretation of the ordinance was tenable,
because it derived some support from state law, 77 and because it was
accepted by the Fourth Circuit, independent Supreme Court review of state
law was "foreclose[d]. ' 8
Justice White, in dissent, was disturbed by this holding.79 He argued that
69. 96 S. Ct. at 2085-86 (Blackmun & Brennan, JJ., dissenting).
70. 279 N.C. 254, 182 S.E.2d 403 (1971).
71. 377 F. Supp. at 504.
72. 279 N.C. at 260, 182 S.E.2d at 407. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 115-142(b) (1965)
provided in relevant part:
When it shall have been determined by a county or city board of education
that an employee is not to be retained for the next succeeding school year
it shall be the duty of the county or city superintendent to notify the employee,
by registered letter . . . of the termination of his contract.
73. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 115-145 (1965).
74. 279 N.C. at 260, 182 S.E.2d at 407.
75. This was essentially the argument advanced by Justices Blackmun and Brennan in
dissent. See 96 S. Ct. at 2085-86.
76. Indeed, the Court relegated Arnett to a footnote stating: "The Court's evaluation
of the federal regulations involved in Arnett sheds no light on the problem presented by
this case." 96 S. Ct. at 2078 n.8.
77. The Court referred to Still v. Lance, 279 N.C. 254, 182 S.E.2d 403 (1971). See
text accompanying notes 70-74 supra for discussion of this case.
78. 96 S. Ct. at 2079.
79. Justice White was jointed in his dissent by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and
Blackmun.
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what the Court had done was to covertly follow the repudiated reasoning of
Justice Rehnquist in Arnett.a0 Justice White maintained that the district
court's finding that Bishop had no property interest was based upon the fact
that the Marion ordinance described its own procedures for determining
cause and these procedures had been followed."' This was essentially the
"procedure can limit the right" argument advanced by Justice Rehnquist in
Arnett.8 2 White claimed that the majority, while purporting to construe the
district court's opinion differently, actually impliedly sanctioned this analy-
sis.88 To support this he pointed to the Court's concluding paragraph which
stated: "In this case, as the District Court construed the ordinance, the City
Manager's determination of the adequacy of the grounds for discharge is not
subject to judicial review; the employee is merely given certain procedural
rights which the District Court found not to have been violated in this
case."8 4  By this language White felt the majority implicitly conceded that
"the ordinance supplie[d] the 'grounds' for discharge and that the City Man-
ager must determine them to be 'adequate' before he may fire an employee."8 5a
The holding that Bishop had no property interest in his job rested, therefore,
on the fact that state law provided no procedures for assuring dismissal only
80. 96 S. Ct. at 2083-85.
81. Justice White relied on the district court language stating:
It is clear from Article II, Section 6, of the City's Personnel Ordinance, that
the dismissal of an employee does not require a notice or a hearing. Upon
request of the discharged employee, he shall be given written notice of his
discharge setting forth the effective date and the reasons for the discharge.
It thus appears that both the city ordinance and the state law have been com-
plied with.
377 F. Supp. at 504. White's reasoning on this point is questionable. Rather than
applying an analysis similar to that used in the Arnett plurality, it seems that the district
court simply did not see an entitlement in the termination standards, as indicated in its
conclusion:
[Bishop] had no tenure, and the city had not created by regulation or policy,
any condition in which its employees could expect continued employment.
Since his dismissal resulted in no deprivation of an interest or right protected
by the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments, he was not entitled to a formal
hearing prior to said dismissal.
Id. at 505.
82. See text accompanying notes 48-50 supra.
83. "The majority purports, at pp. 2077-78, n.8, to read the District Court's opinion
as construing the ordinance not to condition dismissal on cause . . . . However, later in
its opinion the majority appears to eschew this construction ....... 96 S. Ct. at 2083.
The Court's note 8 referred to, states in pertinent part: "In this case, a holding that as
a matter of state law the employee 'held his position at the will and pleasure of the city'
necessarily establishes that he had no property interest." Id. at 2078 n.8.
84. 96 S. Ct. at 2084.
85. 96 S. Ct. at 2084.
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for cause.8 6 Thus, White argued that according to the majority the right to
a job apparently given by the Marion ordinance was redefined by the
procedures provided in the ordinance, and as redefined would be infringed
only if these procedures were not followed.a7 This, he concluded, was
precisely the reasoning rebuked by six members of the Court in Arnett.8
Although the basis for White's analysis may be questioned, 9 it raises the
question of whether the plurality in Arnett has become a majority. Unfor-
tunately, since the Court deferred to the lower court and never expressly
construed the statute or addressed the merits, the answer is unclear.90
The Court's position on liberty is somewhat clearer. Bishop was dis-
charged on grounds of insubordination, contributing to low morale, and
conduct unbecoming an officer. 91 The Court found that dismissal without a
hearing on these grounds did not deprive 'Bishop of any liberty interest.9 2
Justice Stevens noted that the reasons for Bishop's termination were first
communicated orally to him in private and were later "stated in writing in
answer to interrogatories. '19 3 Therefore, the Court determined that since the
first communication was not made public, it could not properly be a basis for
claiming that Bishop's interest in his "'good name, reputation, honesty, or in-
tegrity' was thereby impaired. '9 4 And furthermore, because the second com-
munication was made in the course of a judicial proceeding which did not
commence until after Bishop had been discharged, it could not "provide
retroactive support for his claim."95
Justice Brennan, in dissent, disputed the Court's logic. He was primarily
disturbed by the Court's apparent requirement that a damaging statement
made in the course of termination must be made public before it could in-
fringe liberty. Noting that Bishop was in a profession in which prospective
employees are invariably investigated, he felt that there was no reason
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. text accompanying note 50 supra.
89. See note 81 supra.
90. Indeed, it is interesting that none of the dissenting justices raised the question of
deference.
91. 96 S. Ct. at 2077.
92. Id. at 2079-80.
93. Id. at 2079.
94. Id., citing Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971); see also Paul v.
Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
95. 96 S. Ct. 2079-80. Bishop also argued that the reasons for his discharge were
false, to which the Court responded: "Even so, the reasons stated to him in private
had no different impact on his reputation than if they had been true. And the answers
to his interrogatories, whether true or false, did not cause the discharge." Id. at 2080.
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to assume that the city would not convey these reasons to prospective
employers and subsequently impair Bishop's ability to obtain employment. 9
Furthermore, he argued that the fact that answers to interrogatories were
"published" after discharge was irrelevant, for due process still required an
opportunity for an employee to clear his name when it had been damaged.97
The majority's position finds some support in Paul, which held that the
damage to reputation must be inflicted in the process of terminating employ-
ment. Technically, disclosure of stigmatizing information in discovery is not
done in the process of termination. But this is a tenuous point and on
balance Brennan's dissent seems sounder. The thrust of previous decisions
was to provide an opportunity to clear one's name if damaged. Although
the notion that the stigma had to be made public may have been implicit in
those decisions, it was never expressly stated. Moreover, it is more reasona-
ble to believe that, where it is clear that the reasons for termination will be
passed on and will restrict employment opportunities, a hearing should be
required.
III. CONCLUSION
Regardless of which argument is more reasonable, the Bishop decision
seems to have narrowed the concept of liberty in government employment. It
would now appear that in order to claim a deprivation of liberty due to
stigmatization in the course of discharge, one must also show that the stigma
was made public 8 by means other than litigation or collateral attack on that
termination. The decision's effect on the nature of the property interest is
more difficult to delineate. The majority's deference to the lower court in
particular raises many questions. The Court indicated that when a litigant
attempts to assert that a state law confers an entitlement, it would be
preferable for a state court to determine if an entitlement was present. But
when the state has not done so, the majority also indicated that the lower
federal courts may interpret the law subject only to a "clearly unreasonable"
standard of review. Thus, on its face, the Bishop decision appears to give
the state and the lower federal courts essentially the last word on due process
in this area. Yet it is likely that this issue will arise again and that the
Court used the deference procedure in this case to avoid directly ad-
96. 96 S. Ct. at 2081.
97. Id. The majority maintained that to provide an employee with a post-deprivation
hearing when the stigmatizing reasons become known during litigation "would penalize
forthright and truthful communication . . . between litigants .... "96 S. Ct. at 2080.
But see 96 S. Ct. at 2081 n.3 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
98. The question remains as to what "made public" means. The Bishop Court
provided no criteria.
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dressing the constitutional issue of property interests in government em-
ployment. By avoiding such a decision, however, the Court created uncer-
tainty regarding the status of Justice Rehnquist's argument in Arnett that the
procedure of a law can limit the entitlement granted by it. The Bishop
majority seemed to implicitly embrace this reasoning. But again, as with the
doctrine of deference, one must await another case for a clarification of the
issue.
Warren J. De Vecchio
COMMUNICATIONS-FAIRNESS DOCTRINE-FCC Finds
Violation by Licensee of Obligation to Provide Adequate Cover-
age of Important Public Issues. Mink v. Radio Station WHAR,
59 F.C.C.2d 987 (1976).
The fairness doctrine is a vital component of Government regulation of
radio and television broadcasting.' The doctrine requires the broadcaster to
devote a reasonable percentage of broadcast time to the coverage of public
issues, and requires that this coverage be fair and balanced. 2 Although the
1. Government regulation of the radio industry began with the Radio Act of 1912,
ch. 287, § 1, 37 Stat. 302 (repealed 1927), which asserted the public nature of the
airwaves and upon this premise established governmental regulation and licensure of ra-
dio stations. See S. DAvis, THE LAW OF RAIO COMMUNICATION 54-57 (Ist ed. 1927).
The impotence of the Radio Act and the resultant unfettered and disruptive broadcasting
by an ever-increasing number of radio licensees prompted congressional enactment of
the Radio Act of 1927, ch. 169, § 1, 44 Stat. 1162 (repealed 1934), which created
the Federal Radio Commission (FRC) and charged it with the responsibility of assign-
ing frequencies and of awarding broadcast licenses according to the "public convenience
or necessity." See W. JONES, REGULATED INDUSTRIES, CASES AND MATERIALS 1023-28
(1967). The Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1970), superseded the
Radio Act of 1927 and replaced the FRC with the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC), charging it with regulation and licensure of broadcasters according to the "pub-
lic interest, convenience or necessity." For a brief discussion of this legislative develop-
ment, see Malone, Broadcasting, The Reluctant Dragon: Will the First Amendment
Right of Access End the Suppressing of Controversial Ideas?, 5 U. MIcH. J.L. REFORM
194, 212-13 (1972).
The Supreme Court, in NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943), held that the
FCC's general authority to regulate program content in the public interest was consistent
with the first amendment. It was from this authority to regulate broadcasting in the
public interest that the FRC and the FCC derived the fairness doctrine.
2. The Handling of Public Issues Under the Fairness Doctrine and the Public Inter-
[Vol. 26:434
Casenotes
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has consistently maintained
that strict adherence by broadcasters to the dual obligations of the fairness
doctrine is the single most important requirement of broadcast operation,5 the
Commission has never affirmatively and stringently enforced the first element
of the doctrine, the adequate coverage obligation. 4 Recently, however, in
Mink v. Radio Station WHAR, 5 the FCC determined that a radio station
had violated the fairness doctrine by failing to cover adequately a public issue
that was extremely important and highly controversial in the area served by
the station licensee. Although based on long-recited principles of fairness
doctrine law, this is the first FCC decision in which the Commission explicitly
wielded and relied on the adequate coverage obligation of the fairness doc-
trine to find a violation of the doctrine and to compel licensee programming.
Radio station WHAR served the Clarksburg, West Virginia community,
an area that had "the highest percentage of strip mined land of any county
in the State." During a period in 1974-75, when Congress was considering
significant strip mining legislation, 7 WHAR presented no original program-
ming on the pending legislation or on the general subject of strip mining.
Network broadcasts constituted the sole programming presented, and this, at
most, addressed the legislation or the subject of strip mining only generally
or tangentially. 8 Employing the adequate coverage obligation of the fairness
est Standards of the Communications Act, 48 F.C.C.2d 1, 7 (1974) [hereinafter cited
as 1974 Fairness Report].
3. Committee for the Fair Broadcasting of Controversial Issues, 25 F.C.C.2d 283,
292 (1970).
4. The FCC has never promulgated rules or regulations defining what constitutes a
violation of the first prong of the fairness doctrine (the adequate coverage obligation).
The Commission prefers to abide by an ad hoc determination. Public Communications,
Inc., 50 F.C.C.2d 395, 400 (1974). However, guidelines for the sufficiency of a
complaint alleging violation of the second half of the doctrine (coverage must be fair and
balanced) have been enunciated by the Commission. Applicability of the Fairness
Doctrine in the Handling of Controversial Issues of Public Importance, 40 F.C.C. 598,
600 (1964). The second prong guidelines, however, may be used as an aid in applying
the doctrine's first element. Public Communications, Inc., 50 F.C.C.2d at 400.
5. 59 F.C.C.2d 987 (1976).
6. Id. at 995.
7. See S. 425, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974); H.R. 11500, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
The proposed legislation dealt with the reclamation by mining companies of strip-mined
land. It would have required the companies to restore the mined land to its approximate
original contours and to provide appropriate revegetation of the land to prevent soil
erosion. Other legislation included bills designed both to regulate and to prohibit
entirely strip mining operations. See H.R. 12898, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974); H.R.
13108, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974); H.R. 15000, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974); H.R.
15701, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974); H.R. 15860, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974). Inter-
view with Christopher B. LoPiano, Legislative Representative for the United Mine
Workers of America, in Washington, D.C. (Oct. 4, 1976).
8. 59 F.C.C.2d at 995-96. WHAR admitted that the station "would probably have
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doctrine, Representative Patsy Mink, the Environmental Policy Center, and
a citizen of Clarksburg filed a complaint with the FCC against WHAR. The
complainants submitted extensive amounts of material intending to show that
the issue of strip mining and the pending legislation in Congress were of ex-
treme importance to the people of the Clarksburg area in terms of environ-
mental quality, job opportunity, and economic and societal stability, and that
the strip mining issue was highly controversial, both nationally and locally.9
The fairness complaint against WHAR charged that the broadcast licensee
had failed to inform its listeners of the nature and impact of the pending strip
mining legislation. This failure, the complaint alleged, arose from WHAR's
lack of original programming on the issue and from WHAR's impermissible
delegation of its adequate coverage obligation to outside network program-
ming not tailored to the needs of the area served by the broadcast licensee.10
The complainants requested the Commission to direct WHAR to immediately
schedule programming on strip mining and to reaffirm the licensee's obliga-
tions under the fairness doctrine.11
WHAR countered with the general contention that its outside network pro-
gramming had adequately addressed the strip mining and relevant legislative
issues, 12 and that the strip mining issue, while "important," was not of suf-
ficient public significance to warrant FCC intervention under the fairness
doctrine.' 3  Additionally, the station launched a broad attack on the power
of the Commission to enforce the adequate coverage obligation of the fairness
doctrine. 14
carded over 75%" of this outside network programming but professed ignorance as to
what specific programs or items were provided its listeners. Id. at 990.
9. The complainants used area newspapers and journals, congressional testimony,
and research studies to demonstrate that strip mining had an enormous impact on air and
water quality in Clarksburg, that it induced social and industrial relocation, and that the
pending legislation would significantly affect recreational facilities, employment, and
environmental quality. Id. at 991-92, 995. To these factors the complainants
added "front page" news stories and citizen group response to establish that the issue of
strip mining and the relevant legislation were highly controversial both nationally and in
the area served by WHAR. Id. at 988, 991-92, 995.
10. The petitioners charged that WHAR's broadcast of outside network programming
revealed "absolutely no substantive information on the environmental, economic, physi-
cal or other aspects of strip mining in Clarksburg or Harrison County [the county in
which Clarksburg is situated], or even in West Virginia" and that there was presented
"no local perspective, genuine partisan voices or varying point of view.... ".Id. at
992.
11. Id. at 989.
12. The broadcast licensee had aired wire service news stories, national network news
and public affairs programs, and a tape-recorded message by a West Virginia congress-
man. Id. at 995-96. See also note 8 supra.
13. 59 F.C.C.2d at 990.
14. WHAR challenged the Commission's power both to take any action against the
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The complainants' construction of the strip mining issue as one of extreme
importance and serious controversy in the locality served by WHAR was ac-
cepted by the Commission, which rejected WHAR's arguments that the Com-
mission had no power to enforce the adequate coverage obligation of the fair-
ness doctrine. 15 Relying on prior fairness doctrine policy and relatively re-
cent case law, the Commission held that some issues in a community could
be so critical and of such great public importance that it would be a violation
of the fairness doctrine for a broadcast licensee to ignore them or to treat
them superficially in its programming.' 6 The FCC found that WHAR had
failed to cover adequately the strip mining issue and had abused its discre-
tion by relying totally on network programming not appropriately tailored to
cover the local ramifications of the issue.' 7 The station was directed to sub-
mit plans for adequate coverage of the strip mining controversy.18
Commissioner Glen 0. Robinson, a longtime foe of the fairness doctrine,' 9
reluctantly concurred in the judgment of the Commission. Robinson found
the decision to be in accord with prior fairness doctrine law, but maintained
station should its coverage be found wanting and to require an individual licensee to
cover a particular issue, even a highly critical one. Further, WHAR claimed that any
FCC decision compelling coverage of a particular issue would constitute censorship and
intrusion into licensee discretion guaranteed by fairness doctrine law. Id. at 989-90.
15. The Commission traced policy statements back to 1949 and cited Supreme Court
and FCC cases to support its conclusion that "strict adherence to the fairness doctrine-
including the affirmative obligation to provide coverage of issues of public importance-
[is] the single most important requirement of operation in the public interest. . . . This
obligation includes informing listeners of issues of particular concern to the community
which they are licensed to serve." Id. at 993.
16. Id. at 994.
17. The Commission found that the network programming had only generally or
tangentially addressed the strip mining issues. The dispositive determinations were that
the outside broadcasts had not been tailored to meet specific community needs and
interests and that, in any event, WHAR had no idea of what programming was actually
aired. Id. at 994, 996-97.
18. Id. at 997. WHAR, in response to the Commission's directive, stated that since
January 5, 1975, it had broadcast a weekly half-hour telephone-talk radio program,
which had addressed the strip mining issue. The licensee indicated that for eight weeks,
commencing July 7, 1976, the moderator of the program did "raise the strip mining
issue" on each show, either directly or in response to current news events. Because none
of the original complainants has questioned this degree of compliance, the FCC has not
challenged the adequacy of the coverage, deferring to licensee discretion as to the means
of covering an issue when the licensee has indicated an attempt at adequate coverage.
Interview with Eduard B. Berlin, Attorney Advisor for the Complaints and Compliance
Division of the Federal Communications Commission, in Washington, D.C. (Oct. 26,
1976).
19. See Robinson, The FCC and the First Amendment: Observation on 40 Years of
Radio and Television Regulation, 52 MINN. L. REV. 67, 131-37 (1967) (written before
Robinson's appointment to the FCC); Fairness Doctrine and Public Interest Standards:
Fairness Report Regarding Handling Issues of Public Importance, 58 F.C.C.2d 691, 703-
14 (1976) (Comm'r Robinson, dissenting) [hereinafter cited as 1976 Fairness Report].
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that the unprecedented enforcement of the adequate coverage obligation of
the doctrine would hasten its jettison from communications law. 20
I. THE ADEQUATE COVERAGE OBLIGATION:
"THE LAW HATH NOT BEEN DEAD, THOUGH IT HATH SLEPT"1
21
The adequate coverage obligation of the fairness doctrine has been an inte-
gral part of fairness doctrine law and rhetoric for almost three decades. 22
Because broadcast frequencies are scarce, Congress, the FCC, and the courts
have considered broadcast licensees as fiduciaries or trustees of a great public
resource-the airwaves.28  Congress, in the Radio Act of 192724 and the
Communications Act of 1934,25 charged broadcasters, as trustees of a public
resource, to operate in the public interest 26 so that their exclusive control of
the airwaves would redound to the public good.2 7 The FCC and its predeces-
20. 59 F.C.C.2d at 999.
21. SHAKESPEARE, MEASURE FOR MEASURE, Act 2, Scene 2.
22. The FCC's 1949 report on Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246
[hereinafter cited as Editorializing Report], provided the first basic articulation of the
fairness doctrine and its adequate coverage obligation: "The Commission has ...
recognized the necessity for licensees to devote a reasonable percentage of their broad-
cast time to the presentation of news and programs devoted to the consideration and
discussion of public issues of interest in the community served by the particular station."
Id. at 1249. There is some dispute as to whether this report, still considered the most
comprehensive statement of the fairness doctrine, represents the birth of the doctrine or
if antecedent decisions by the FRC and the FCC laid the substantive groundwork for the
doctrine. See, e.g., Robert H. Scott, 11 F.C.C. 372 (1946) (all subjects of substantial
importance to the community should be presented); United Broadcasting Co., 10 F.C.C.
515, 517 (1945) (each licensee has duty to be sensitive to the problems of public con-
cern in the community and to make sufficient time available for full discussion thereof);
Metropolitan Broadcasting Corp., 8 F.C.C. 557 (1941) (broadcast licensee has duty to
present well-rounded programs on public controversies of the day); Great Lakes Broad-
casting Co., 3 F.R.C. Ann. Rep. 32 (1929), rev'd on other grounds, 37 F.2d 993 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 281 U.S. 706 (1930) (public interest requires that ample broadcast
time be devoted to the fair and free competition of opposing views).
23. "[R]adio stations should not be used for the private interest, whims, or caprices of
the particular persons who have been granted licenses, but in a manner which will serve
the community generally and the various groups which will make up the community."
Editorializing Report, supra note 22, at 1248. See also Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v.
FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 389, 394, 396 (1969); Office of Communication of United Church
of Christ v. FCC, 425 F.2d 543, 548 (1969), rev'g on rehearing 359 F.2d 994 (D.C.
Cir. 1966); Editorializing Report, supra note 22, at 1247; 1974 Fairness Report, supra
note 2, at 5-6. See generally Mallamud, The Broadcast Licensee as Fiduciary: Toward
the Enforcement of Discretion, 1973 DUKE L.J. 89, 106-13.
24. Radio Act of 1927 ch. 169, § 1, 44 Stat. 1162 (repealed 1934).
25. 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1970). See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367,
377-78, 383-86 (1969); Editorializing Report, supra note 22, at 1249-50; 1974
Fairness Report, supra note 2, at 4-7.
26. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 303, 307(a), (d), 309(a), 312(a)(2) (1970).
27. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 394 (1969).
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sor, the Federal Radio Commission, interpreted this public trust to include
adherence to the obligations of the fairness doctrine.28 Full and fair presen-
tation by broadcasters of issues of public importance was seen as essential
not only to faithful operation in the public interest but also to successful im-
plementation of the system of free expression inherent in the mandate of the
first amendment. 29 Broadcasters are thus charged with the obligation to pre-
sent adequate coverage of important public issues in order to inform the com-
munities they serve of those issues and problems that are locally important
and controversial.3 0
The licensee, however, is not obligated to devote air time to every public
issue or even to every controversial issue of public importance within the
community it serves.3 1 Rather, the FCC obliges the broadcaster to ascertain
community needs and interests,3 2 with wide discretion given the licensee
28. See Editorializing Report, supra note 22; 1974 Fairness Report, supra note 2, at 4-
7, 9-10. The dual obligations of the doctrine evolved from FCC cases and policy
statements involving regulation in the public interest. Congress gave statutory endorse-
ment to the fairness doctrine in amending, in 1959, section 315(a) of the Communica-
tions Act of 1934, ch. 652, § 315, 48 Stat. 1088 (1934) (current version at 47 U.S.C. §
315(a)(4) (1970)). See H.R. REP. No. 1069, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1959). In Red
Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969), the Court upheld the constitution-
ality of the fairness doctrine which it found implicit in the public interest standards of
the Communications Act of 1934. Id. at 375-86. In CBS, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l
Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973), the Court suggested that the Communications Act of 1934
required strong enforcement of the fairness doctrine. See 1976 Fairness Report, supra
note 19, at 693-94.
29. [Ilt is . ..clear that one of the basic elements of any such operation [in the
public interest] is the maintenance of radio and television as a medium of freedom of
speech and freedom of expression. . . " Editorializing Report, supra note 22, at 1248.
It is the right of the public, as guaranteed by required broadcast operation in the public
interest and by permissible FCC regulation of broadcasting to promote first amendment
expression,
to be informed and to have presented to it for acceptance or rejection the
different attitudes and viewpoints concerning these vital and often controversial
issues which are held by the various groups which make up the community.
It is this right of the public to be informed, rather than any right on the part
of the Government, any broadcast licensee, or any individual member of the
public . , . which is the foundation stone of the American system of broad-
casting.
Id. at 1249. See also Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390-94 (1969);
Green v. FCC, 447 F.2d 323, 329 (D.C. Cir. 1971); King Broadcasting Co., 23
F.C.C.2d 41, 43-44 (1970); 1974 Fairness Report, supra note 2, at 5.
30. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 393-94 (1969). The adequate
coverage obligation applies even when state law is to the contrary. See State v.
University of Me., 266 A.2d 863 (Me. 1970).
31. Public Communication, Inc., 50 F.C.C.2d 395, 397-98 (1974); Editorializing
Report, supra note 22, at 1251; 1974 Fairness Report, supra note 2, at 8-9.
32. Primer on Ascertainment of Community Problems by Broadcast Applicants, 27
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regarding the choice and manner of coverage of issues.83 The broad-
cast licensee, however, must provide adequate coverage of public is-
sues at his own expense and by his own initiative if sponsorship is unavail-
able from another source.3 4  The Commission reviews broadcasters' deci-
sions, when necessary, to determine whether they are reasonable and in good
faith.3 5 The FCC has stated that the responsibility to provide adequate cov-
erage cannot be delegated to any national network or other licensee, and if
a broadcaster avails himself of substantial network programming he must
complement the outside programming with local broadcasts addressing cur-
rent community issues.3 6
While the adequate coverage obligation has been articulated frequently in
FCC decisions and policy statements and has been embellished with fairness
doctrine principles, the Commission has not addressed the precise scope of
this aspect of the doctrine until relatively recently. The Commission has de-
clared that some issues will be so important to a community that they assume
"critical" significance,3 7 but these instances of compelled coverage in the
face of critical issues have been deemed the "rare" cases.38  Despite
F.C.C.2d 650 (1971). The Primer requires applicants to ferret out community needs,
interests, and problems by means of personal contacts and interviews with community
leaders so that broadcasters will be able to present program schedules that are re-
sponsive to the problems of their communities and serve to stimulate the solution of
community problems. Id. at 656-58.
33. Editorializing Report, supra note 22, at 1247, 1251; 1974 Fairness Report, supra
note 2, at 8-10. This grant of broad discretion serves to achieve vigorous debate while
avoiding the "dangers of censorship or pervasive supervision" by the government.
Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082, 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied sub nom. Tobacco
Inst. v. FCC, 396 U.S. 842 (1969). See also 47 U.S.C. § 326 (1970) (proscription of
FCC conduct amounting to censorship).
34. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 377-78 (1969); Cullman Broad-
casting Co., 40 F.C.C. 576 (1963); John J. Dempsey, 6 P & F Radio Reg. 615 (1950).
35. Madalyn Murray, 40 F.C.C. 647, 651 (1965); Editorializing Report, supra note
22, at 1251-52. The determination of whether a licensee has acted reasonably in good
faith is a question of fact. The Commission considers the facts and competing
arguments and determines what would amount to reasonable coverage in the circum-
stances, given that the fairness doctrine imposes affirmative responsibilities. See 1976
Fairness Report, supra note 19, at 697.
36. Editorializing Report, supra note 22, at 1248; see, e.g., WHEC, Inc., 52 F.C.C.2d
1079, 1085 (1975) (the key is the responsiveness to the community needs and not
necessarily the original source of broadcast matter).
37. 1974 Fairness Report, supra note 2, at 10.
38. Id. These cases are the exception from the general practice of FCC deference to
broadcaster discretion. Such deference is due to the limited occurrence of issues that are
"critical," the FCC's reluctance to define what constitutes critical issues, and the FCC's
hesitance to intrude on a broadcaster's journalistic role. Indeed, the first amendment
ramifications of a decision to compel a licensee to cover a particular issue have been the
subject of serious dispute. See, e.g., Schenkkan, Power in the Marketplace of Ideas: The
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their rarity, however, the Commission has found it patently unreason-
able for a broadcaster to ignore these critical issues in its programming, to
treat them piecemeal or insufficiently, or to delegate programming responsi-
bility to the extent that local aspects of the "critical" issue would not be ad-
dressed. 9 Such abuse of programming discretion granted licensees would
constitute a violation of the adequate coverage obligation.
40
Several decisions by the FCC in the last six years have expanded the scope
of the first obligation of the fairness doctrine. In one case, Gary Soucie,
41
the complainants alleged that a broadcaster, by airing commercials extolling
the virtues of large automobiles, became obliged to present views that in-
formed the public of the environmental and health liabilities associated with
the glamor of such cars.42 In dicta to a decision denying the requested relief,
the FCC addressed itself to the responsibilities of a broadcaster when con-
fronted with "critical" issues of public importance. 43  The Commission de-
ferred to the discretion of the licensee, 44 but left no doubt that some issues
demanded coverage for the purpose of public education.45  When an issue
would "determine the quality of life for a decade or centuries to come," the
Fairness Doctrine and the First Amendment, 52 TEx. L. REV. 727, 733-40 (1974);
Comment, Enforcing the Obligation to Present Controversial Issues: The Forgotten
Half of the Fairness Doctrine, 10 HARv. Cirv. RIGHTs-CIv. LIB. L. REV. 137, 142-46
(1975).
39. En Banc Programming Inquiry, 44 F.C.C. 2303, 2313-15 (1960).
40. See notes 22-30 & accompanying text supra.
41. 24 F.C.C.2d 743 (1970), rev'd on other grounds sub nor. Friends of the Earth v.
FCC, 449 F.2d 1164 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
42. The complainants relied on the second prong of the fairness doctrine: that once a
broadcaster presents, in its programming, a view on controversial issues of public
importance (i.e., the virtues of large cars), it is compelled to present opposing views. The
Commission has compelled such responsive programming on a number of issues. See,
e.g., Accuracy in Media, 40 F.C.C.2d 958 (1973) (private pension systems). But see
Center for Auto. Safety, 32 F.C.C.2d 926 (1972) (automobile air bags); Thomas M.
Slaten, 28 F.C.C.2d 315 (1971) (quality of the judiciary); David S. Tillson, 24 F.C.C.2d
297 (1970) (theory of evolution). The rationales and results of these cases are similar
to those in situations in which the broadcaster would be compelled to air programming
on "critical" issues under the adequate coverage obligation.
43. While we have stressed that the broadcaster has large discretion in choosing
and covering controversial issues of public importance, it would be no more
reasonable for broadcasting to ignore these burning issues of the seventies
[environmental pollution]-which may determine the quality of life for decades
or centuries to come-than it would be to ignore the issue of Vietnam or the
issue of racial unrest in communities racked by this problem.
24 F.C.C.2d at 750-51.
44. Of course, the broadcast licensee retains discretion as to issues, format,
appropriate spokesmen, etc. Thus a broadcaster located in an area with no air
pollution issue but a severe water pollution one would clearly focus on the
latter . . . . In short, there remain wide areas for judgment by the licensee,
based upon the facts of his particular area.
24 F.C.C.2d at 751 n.9.
45. Id. at 750-51,
Casenotes1977]
Catholic University Law Review
broadcaster would be compelled to air adequate programming on the issue."6
The decision never explicitly referred to the adequate coverage obligation of
the fairness doctrine, but its dicta, that issues such as environmental pollution
required suitable coverage, alluded to that obligation.
Radio Station WSNT 47 presented the Commission with a different "criti-
cal" issue. In this case, the complainants petitioned the FCC to determine
whether a radio station, which alone served a community beset by racial con-
flict, could refuse to air broadcasts concerning the conflict without failing to
serve the "public interest."'4 s  The FCC declared it to be WSNT's partic-
ular obligation as the only station licensed to serve the troubled community
"to air major local problems for the benefit of the community. ' 49 The Com-
mission noted that the record raised serious questions as to whether WSNT
had met this obligation and ordered an evidentiary hearing. The ruling left
the strong suggestion that the broadcaster's license was in jeopardy unless the
racial issue received adequate and, full coverage.5 0 WSNT, decided upon
public interest standards, comports with the components of the adequate cov-
erage obligation. Stations, especially those which exclusively serve a particu-
lar community, are obligated to air programs addressing significant problems
that plague the community. 5'
While the petitioners in Gary Soucie and WSNT relied on grounds other
than the adequate coverage obligation, the complainants in Public Communi-
46. Id.
47. 27 F.C.C.2d 993 (1971).
48. The Commission expressly framed the issue in public interest terms, made no
mention of the first prong of the fairness doctrine, and saw only a tangential fairness
doctrine issue. Id. at 996. A possible reason for this construction of the issue was that
petitioners requested a denial of WSNT's application for license renewal, which required
the Commission to determine whether the subject licensee had operated in the public
interest. See Honorable Orwen Harris, 40 F.C.C. 582, 583 (1963) (explaining the
procedural differences between reviewing fairness complaints and considering license
renewal applications). Many complainants appear to choose license renewal time to
challenge the adequacy of a station's coverage of important public issues. While
reiterating the principles of the licensee's obligation to serve the community and to give
adequate coverage to local needs and problems, the Commission, in all but a handful of
cases, does not deny renewal applications. See, e.g., WHEC, Inc., 52 F.C.C.2d 1079
(1975); La Fiesta Broadcasting Co., 37 P & F Radio Reg. 983 (1976). See Comment,
supra note 38, at 150-55.
49. 27 F.C.C.2d at 995. The licensee could not "simply refrain from taking any
action, thereby effectively ignoring the situation." Id.
50. Id. at 999-1000. Faced with a clearly hostile Commission, WSNT resolved the
problem by proposing substantial programming designed to address the racial issues in
the community it served. Radio Station WSNT, 31 F.C.C.2d 1080, 1081-82 (1971).
51. A number of cases have affirmatively and broadly cited this principle of WSNT
in other contexts. See, e.g., Storer Broadcasting Co., 41 F.C.C.2d 792, 811 (1973); Taft
Broadcasting Co., 38 F.C.C.2d 770, 790 (1973); Time-Life Broadcast, Inc., 33 F.C.C.2d
1050, 1078 (1972).
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cation, Inc. -5 2 alleged that a broadcast licensee had directly violated that ele-
ment of the fairness doctrine by failing to cover adequately legislation pend-
ing in Congress regarding radio and television license renewals. In rejecting
this claim, 58 the Commission further elucidated the adequate coverage obliga-
tion. This first obligation of the fairness doctrine, the Commission declared,
imposed a "general obligation" on licensees to cover important public issues,
but had "a very limited application to the programming of specific issues."' "4
The decision indicated that the "critical issue" responsibility of the licensee
was to be "invoked sparingly" in a "very limited class of issues" when it
would be clearly unreasonable for a broadcaster to ignore the particular is-
sue.
5 5
The effect of these decisions is to permit the broadcast licensee wide discre-
tion in choosing which issues to cover in its programming. Other than the
specific circumstances considered in a few FCC cases, the broadcaster has
been given no yardstick by which to judge what issues are "critical." Given
the narrow range of the "critical issue" responsibility of the licensee, it is per-
haps understandable why, prior to Mink v. Radio Station WHAR, a violation
of the adequate coverage obligation had never been found by the FCC, and
why the Commission had never imposed sanctions5" or compelled coverage
under the "critical issue" responsibility of the fairness doctrine. 57 Yet many
commentators allege that there is a widespread failure of licensees to ade-
52. 50 F.C.C.2d 395 (1974).
53. Id. at 400.
54. Id. at 399.
55. Id. at 400. See Council on Children, Media and Merchandizing, 36 P & F
Radio Reg. 1422 (1976), and American Broadcasting Co., 56 F.C.C.2d 275 (1975),
in which the FCC refused to compel additional programming under the adequate cov-
erage obligation.
56. Several sanctions are available to the FCC. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. §§ 303(m)(1)
(suspension of licenses), 307(a) (denial of applications for license renewals), 307(d)
(granting of probationary license renewals for a term of less than the usual three years),
312(a) (immediate license revocation), 312(b) (cease and desist orders), 503(b) (im-
position of fines and forfeitures) (1970). In reality, most fairness doctrine sanctions
take the form of the "lifted eyebrow"-the threat of action or of close scrutiny of a
licensee's renewal application. See Comment, The Regulation of Competing First
Amendment Rights: A New Fairness Doctrine Balance After CBS?, 122 U. PA. L.
REV. 1283, 1293-95 (1974).
57. In fiscal year 1971, there were 2,000 fairness complaints which prompted 168
FCC inquiries, Sixty-nine inquiries resulted in agency rulings with no more than five
adverse to the licensee. None of these adverse rulings involved the adequate coverage
obligation. See Rosenfeld, The Jurisprudence of Fairness: Freedom Through Regulation
in the Marketplace of Ideas, 44 FORDHAM L. REV. 877, 893 n.77 (1976). Similarly,
no adverse findings involving the adequate coverage obligation occurred in 1973-74 when
19 adverse findings were made. See 1976 Fairness Report, supra note 19, at 709 n.14.
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quately cover critical public issues. 58 Such recalcitrance led Judge (now
Chief Justice) Burger to comment in 1966 that "[a]fter nearly five decades of
operation the broadcast industry does not seem to have grasped the simple
fact that a broadcast license is a public trust . . . ."5 In the face of this
failure to cover public issues adequately, constitutional, economic, adminis-
trative, and structural barriers have resulted in a "curious neutrality-in-favor-
of-the-licensee" on the part of the FCC.60
II. THE LAW AWAKES
Mink v. Radio Station WHAR 61 represents the first time the FCC found
a violation of and compelled programming under the "critical issue" responsi-
bility of the adequate coverage obligation. The Commission, looking to the
Editorializing Report of 1949,62 relied on established fairness doctrine law,
63
but significantly buttressed and explained the adequate coverage responsibili-
ties of broadcast licensees.
The FCC found two factors in Mink to be dispositive of the com-
plaint. The first was the character of the strip mining controversy in the
area served by WHAR. This was of the type included in the "very limited
58. See Mallamud, supra note 23, at 115-22; Marks, Broadcasting and Censorship:
First Amendment Theory After Red Lion, 38 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 974, 976-77 (1970);
Comment, supra note 38, at 148-49, 150-55; Comment, supra note 56, at 1294-95. For
a brief discussion of the reasons broadcasters avoid coverage of important public issues
see Schenkkan, supra note 38, at 728-29.
59. Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994,
1003 (1966), rev'd on rehearing, 425 F.2d 543 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
60. Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 425 F.2d 543, 547
(1969), rev'g on rehearing 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966). Accord, Citizens Communi-
cations Center v. FCC, 447 F.2d 1201, 1207-08 (D.C. Cir. 1971). The constitutional
barriers to the enforcement of the adequate coverage obligation by the FCC include the
first amendment prohibition against program regulation that amounts to censorship. See
note 38 supra & authorities cited therein. Economic barriers include the tremendous
costs to a broadcaster if his license is revoked. Administrative barriers include the inade-
quate number of FCC staff personnel and the shortage of staff time that would result if
the Commission embarked on a policy of strictly determining whether stations were
fulfilling their affirmative responsibilities under the adequate coverage obligation. Addi-
tionally, there is the FCC reluctance to have its powers tested in court. Structural bar-
riers include the relatively few adequate coverage complaints heard by the Commission
and frequent complainant reliance on public interest standards instead of fairness stand-
ards. See note 48 & accompanying text supra. For a general discussion of the above-
mentioned barriers see note 58 supra & authorities cited therein.
61. 59 F.C.C.2d 987 (1976).
62. Editorializing Report, supra note 22, at 1246.
63. 59 F.C.C.2d at 993-94. The Commission repeated the basic licensee obligations
and reasserted the importance of strict conformity to the fairness doctrine. Id.
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class" of critical and "burning" issues. 64  Relying on Gary Soucie65 and
WSNT, 66 the FCC deemed the strip mining issue to be a "critical controver-
sial issue of public importance in Clarksburg" that would affect the "quality
of life" there "for decades to come."67
The second dispositive factor in Mink was the Commission's belief that
WHAR had not acted reasonably and had abused its programming discretion
by delegating coverage of the strip mining issue to outside network program-
ming. The network programming broadcast by WHAR had not specifically
addressed the strip mining issue and, in any event, did not deal with the na-
ture and impact of the issue in Clarksburg. Furthermore, the station li-
censee had no idea what particular programs or items were provided its listen-
ers.6s The Commission found this delegation and WHAR's ignorance of
what was aired to be violative of the long-established prohibition against dele-
gation of coverage responsibility, 9 the requirement of tailoring outside pro-
gramming to local needs and problems,70 and the requirement of diligent ef-
forts by the licensee to inform its listeners of critical public issues. 71 The
FCC found that WHAR had acted unreasonably in failing to provide ade-
quate coverage of the critical issue of strip mining7 2 and that WHAR had
therefore violated the fairness doctrine. 78
The Mink decision resulted in three important gains for fairness doctrine
law. First, it reaffirmed the viability of the adequate coverage obligation 74
64. 59 F.C.C.2d at 995, 997. The Commission used congressional testimony, news-
paper and periodical articles, and research studies to demonstrate the enormous impact of
the strip mining controversy on air and water quality and on the economic and social
prospects of the Clarksburg area.
65. 24 F.C.C.2d 743 (1970), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Friends of the Earth
v. FCC, 449 F.2d 1164 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
66. 27 F.C.C.2d 993 (1971).
67. 59 F.C.C.2d at 995, 997.
68. Id. at 995-97.
69. See note 36 and accompanying text supra.
70. Id.
71. See note 32 & accompanying text supra.
72. Where, as in the present case, an issue has significant and possibly unique
impact on the licensee's service area, it will not be sufficient for the licensee
as an indication of compliance with the fairness doctrine to show that it may
have broadcast an unknown amount of news touching on a general topic re-
lated to the issue cited in a complaint. Rather it must be shown that there has
been some attempt to inform the public of the nature of the controversy, not
only that such controversy exists.
59 F.C.C.2d at 997.
73. WHAR was directed to submit for consideration programming designed to meet
the station licensee's fairness doctrine responsibilities. Id. See note 18 supra.
74. The Commission declared that "[w]ithout licensee compliance with the responsi-
bility to cover adequately vital public issues, the obligation to present contrasting views
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and reasserted the enforceability of the "critical issue" responsibility against
reluctant broadcasters. 75 Second, the decision articulated criteria for defin-
ing those issues within the rare class of "critical" public issues. It is
now established that complainants may utilize media information and re-
search studies to advocate the critical importance of a particular issue.7 6 In
addition, the Commission's statement that violation of the fairness doctrine
arises when a licensee fails to cover an issue "which has tremendous impact
within the local service area" may possibly serve to expand the critical issue
class beyond wars, local racial conflict, and environmental pollution. 77
Finally, the Mink case obliges broadcasters to maintain a higher degree of
performance in the public interest. When critical issues of public impor-
tance are concerned, licensees must monitor the substance of the broadcasts
covering those issues. Also, the practically unbridled discretion given li-
censees in choosing which issues to cover will be restricted by their obligation
to provide substantive and informative programming on issues critically im-
portant to the community they serve.
There are, however, several possible limitations on the force of the Mink
holding. The case dealt with a "traditional" critical issue-environmental
damage that would affect the quality of life in a particular community for
many years. Consequently, Mink may be limited to this recognized interpre-
tation of the rare critical issue rather than extended to embrace more general
issues of "tremendous impact" and "vital concern" in a particular community.
[the second prong of the doctrine] would have little success as a means to inform the
listening public." 59 F.C.C.2d at 993.
75. The enforceability may be seen in two respects: direct sanctions against broad-
casters for violation of the rule of Mink or, perhaps more importantly, use of the rule of
Mink as a threat to hesitant broadcasters without actual imposition of sanctions. See
note 56 supra.
76. The FCC relied on congressional testimony, "front-page" news stories, journal
articles, and research studies, as well as physical and sociological data, to establish its
finding that the strip mining issue was a critical public issue. In addition, the
Commission looked at the physical, environmental, sociological, economic, and aesthetic
impact of strip mining on the area served by the station licensee. 59 F.C.C.2d at 995. It
seems that the FCC allowed the consideration of the above resources and data even
though some of them did not address the local impact of strip mining in and around
Clarksburg and even though some of the sources were taken from areas outside WHAR's
service area. Id. at 991.
77. Id. at 997. The Commission's holding and rationale were not based solely upon
the environmental nature of the critical issue. See note 76 supra. The decision in-
dicates a critical public issue to be one that "has tremendous impact within the local
service area," one that has a "significant and possibly unique impact" on a service area,
or one that may "determine the quality of life" in a service area "for years to
come." Id. at 997. The FCC, in determining the nature of the problem before it,
stated that "[i]f the fairness doctrine is to have any meaningful impact, broadcasters
must cover, at the very least, those topics which are of vital concern to their listeners,"
Id. at 993 (emphasis added).
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Additionally, the unprecedented enforcement of the adequate coverage obli-
gation may be reserved for future application only in cases in which licensees
exhibit the kind of programming conduct practiced by WHAR-failure to
originate programming addressed to a critical public issue, failure to tailor
network programming to this issue, and ignorance of the content of network
programming actually aired.78
Mink does not signal the emergence of strong FCC enforcement of the first
element of the fairness doctrine. The Commission's written opinion was lim-
ited to discussion of the rare "critical issue" responsibility of licensees. More-
over, the opinion was silent regarding the general fairness doctrine obligation
to provide coverage of more common public issues. This obligation, given the
pervasiveness of general public issues, is perhaps more crucial to the purposes
of the fairness doctrine but has yet to be enforced strictly by the FCC. While
critical issues must now be covered suitably, issues of lesser importance to
the community might never be broadcast.
Another limitation to the significance of Mink's explicit enforcement of the
first prong of the fairness doctrine may well be the reaction to the concept
of the FCC forcing a broadcaster to cover a particular issue.79 Although the
Mink rationale is deeply embedded in fairness doctrine law, the constitutional
ramifications of the decision may lead to increasing pressure to modify or
totally eliminate the doctrine.8 0
78. See note 17 supra. Further, the import of Mink may be vitiated by the
Commission's traditional deference to the licensee's discretion in choosing and covering
issues. WHAR was found to be patently unreasonable in its programming conduct, but
the criteria for FCC intervention in licensee discretion continues to be the reasonable-
ness and good faith of the broadcaster. WHAR's compliance with the Mink decision
underlines the frailty of the decision itself. See note 18 supra. Despite the strong and
unprecedented rule of Mink, WHAR was allowed to fulfill its adequate coverage
obligations with a weekly, half-hour, telephone-talk program on which the moderator
raised the strip mining issue. The failure of the original complainants to appeal
the WHAR compliance report and the FCC's traditional deference to licensee discretion
in this matter explains the allowance of WHAR's lackluster compliance. Had the
original complainants appealed the compliance report, the FCC response might have
been different. The fact remains, however, that licensees are compelled to give adequate
coverage to critical issues; but the FCC cannot issue fairness doctrine inquiries and
decisions on its own motion-it is up to private individuals to initiate such actions.
79. Such a reaction may well center on the first amendment aspects of this compul-
sion, an issue not addressed by the FCC in Mink although requested by WHAR to
do so. 59 F.C.C.2d at 989-90. For initial reaction to the Mink decision, see 122 CONG.
REc. S10297 (daily ed. June 23, 1976) (remarks of Sen. Proxmire); 122 CoNG. REC.
H6470-71 (daily ed. June 22, 1976) (remarks of Rep. Mink); 122 CONG. REC. S8919-
20 (daily ed. June 10, 1976) (remarks of Sen. Proxmire); Fitzpatrick, Federal News
Editors, Wash. Star, June 24, 1976, at 18, col. 1; 10 Press Censorship Newsletter of the
Reporters' Committee for Freedom of the Press, 112-14 (Sept.-Oct. 1976); Resolution
of the Bd. of Directors, Nat'l Ass'n of Broadcasters, June 14-17, 1976.
80. 59 F.C.C.2d at 998-99 (Comm'r Robinson, concurring).
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Ill. CONCLUSION
Mink v. Radio Station WHAR marks a bold move on the part of the Fed-
eral Communications Commission-the unprecedented enforcement of the
adequate coverage responsibilities of the fairness doctrine. The true impact
of Mink, however, will depend on how the Commission applies it in the fu-
ture. The decision could well have laid the groundwork for expanded en-
forcement of the adequate coverage obligation on the common public issue
level or it could be restricted to the confines of its particular facts. It would
seem that the first amendment considerations inherent in Mink's holding, as
well as its extreme factual setting, make unlikely a broad application of the
decision.
In any event, radio and television broadcasters must now give appropriate
air time to the "burning issues of the seventies." 81 Additionally, those con-
cerned with responsive broadcast media will find in Mink substantive bases
for fairness doctrine complaints. Moreover, as Commissioner Robinson sug-
gested in his concurrence in Mink, the decision portends serious consideration
of the continued efficacy and purpose of the fairness doctrine itself.82
P. Michael Nugent, Jr.
81. 24 F.C.C.2d at 750-51.
82. 59 F.C.C.2d at 998-99,
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